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Grafton is correct in claiming that the subject of resource rentals is “complex.”
However, he has not successfully argued that the “realities of fisheries management”
call for special taxation of the rental value of the fishery.
Consider, for example, Grafton’s suggestion that an ad valorem tax can reduce
the variance faced by fishers and, thus, result in an increase in aggregate rents. If his
suggestion is to have merit, fishers must be sufficiently risk averse that the benefits
of special taxation off-set the negative consequences. Grafton does not present in-
formation indicating that either he or fishery managers know whether fishers are in
fact risk averse and, if they are, to what degree. Here, as in much of his previous
work, Grafton seems all too willing to assume that the government knows how to set
an optimal tax. Moreover, when considering the merits of Grafton’s special ad valo-
rem tax, one should recognize that fishing firms often are subject to an income tax
in one form or another. Thus, variance-reducing taxes are already present in tax
codes such as New Zealand’s. Accordingly, if Grafton’s suggestion is to warrant fur-
ther consideration, he should demonstrate why the fishing industry, vis à vis other
industries also subject to income tax, should be the object of special taxation.
Grafton also suggests that I have exaggerated the incentives for innovation pro-
vided by quota ownership when it is unencumbered by special taxation. I do not be-
lieve that I have exaggerated the case, but more to the point. Grafton does not deny
the positive incentive effects of quota ownership addressed in my paper, nor does
his discussion offer additional insights on this issue. Indeed, if anything, Grafton re-
veals the slim reed supporting his advocacy for rent capture when he suggests that
taxation would allow new entrants into the fishery and that these individuals are the
fishers most willing to undertake innovation. Of course, I concur that a tax on quota
value would lower the market price of quota. According to Grafton, this would make
entry more attractive to younger fishers who supposedly are those most open to in-
novation. In making this argument, not only is Grafton relying on capital market im-
perfections, but he is asserting that these capital-starved younger entrants will be-
come the industry’s innovators. There are many dimensions to innovation, and one
that has played a special role in the New Zealand fishery has been the development
of new marketing methods for the export market. Here, large vertically integrated
firms such Sealords Ltd. have been the leaders, not Grafton’s young capital-deprived
entrants.
Grafton is also under the impression that taxing rents will somehow make the
initial allocation of quota less difficult and can reduce rent-seeking behavior.
Clearly, if the government threatens to tax away rents in a fishery, there is less rea-
son for fishers to fight over the initial allocation of quota. But then we are left with
the age-old problem of where the political support for an ITQ system would origi-
nate. Grafton then discusses rent seeking, but the example he offers does not support
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his argument. According to Grafton, high returns in the Canadian snow crab fishery
resulted in rent seeking. However, just because the Canadian government responded
to lobbying pressure and issued quota to outside entities, this does not justify taxa-
tion. Instead, to reduce this type of rent seeking behavior, private property rights to
the fishery should be better defined to prevent the government from simply issuing
additional rights. Moreover, if Grafton had his way and the government were in the
process of setting a special tax, we should expect to observe considerable rent seek-
ing behavior in the form of lobbying efforts to reduce that tax.
Finally, allow me to briefly comment on Grafton’s question “exactly who should
benefit from ITQs?” My response is the traditional one: This is the wrong question
to ask if you are attempting to understand human behavior and how it is affected by
institutional change.